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Abstract
For audio signals, we use the sign of the coefficients of the redundant discrete wavelet
transform to generate primary hash vectors assigning bit 1 to positive or zero coefficients
and bit 0 in the negative case. Discarding the highest frequency band and using a 6 step
transform we get for each sample a 6 bit primary hash value which we may save as an
integer. We then select a possible primary hash value (in our experiments we chose 0
or 63) and take the time indices where this primary hash value occurs as the secondary
hash vector which is attributed to the whole audio signal. Comparing two audio signals,
the number of elements in the intersection of the corresponding time indices are called
“number of matches”, a high number may indicate a similarity between the files. This
secondary hash vector turns out to be robust against addition of noise, GSM-, G.726-,
MP3 coding and packet loss. It may therefore be useful to detect spam telephone calls
without analyzing the semantic content by the similarity of the corresponding signals.
An algorithm is given to detect similar but shifted signals. Results of experiments are
reported using a test corpus of 5 000 audio files of regular calls and 200 audio files of
different versions of 20 original spam recordings augmented by a set of 45 files of different
versions of 9 “special spam” signals.
1 Introduction
The reported results are intended to be applied in a general framework as it is described
for instance in [2]. Here we focus on the calculation of audio fingerprints and their use
to identify similar audio signals without analyzing their content by speech recognition.
Traditionally this is done by Fourier methods. It is tempting to use wavelet methods
instead, as the wavelet transform is local, first experiences are for instance reported in [1]
and [3]. A further advantage of the wavelet transform is the fast algorithm to calculate
wavelet coefficients by cascaded filter banks where the number of operations grows only
proportionally to the number of samples (see figure 1). A disadvantage of such cascaded
filter banks is the complicated behaviour of the coefficients if the signal is shifted: a shift
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Figure 1: Cascaded filter banks to calculate wavelet coefficients
of the signal does not lead to a corresponding shift of the coefficients due to subsampling.
Therefore we use here the redundant wavelet transform, which is also called stationary
wavelet transform or unsubsampled wavelet transform. It does not have this disadvantage,
shifted signals lead to shifted coefficients. We partially adopt normalization and notation
from [5], but note that we maintain here the tilde for the analysis filters and functions.
Let ϕ˜ be the scaling function and ψ˜ be the wavelet. We suppose that the wavelet is
constructed in the framework of a multiresolution analysis and that the normalization is
such that the low pass coefficients fulfill
∑
h˜(k) = 1. The two scale relation is then
ϕ˜(x) = 2
∑
k∈Z
h˜(k)ϕ˜(2x− k). (1)
and the wavelet is given by
ψ˜(x) = 2
∑
k∈Z
g˜(k)ϕ˜(2x− k). (2)
The coefficients for a continuous signal f are then given by
ri(k) = 2
−i
∫
f(x)ψ˜(2−ix− 2−ik)dx, (3)
si(k) := 2
−i
∫
f(x)ϕ˜(2−ix− 2−ik)dx, (4)
and may be calculated by
si(k) =
∑
l∈Z
h˜lsi−1(k + 2i−1l), ri(k) =
∑
l∈Z
g˜lsi−1(k + 2i−1l). (5)
where we start as usual with s0(k) as the sampled values of the continuous signal. This
may be visualized by the cascaded filter bank shown in figure 2. Replacing H˜(z−1)
by H˜(z−p) means inserting zeros into the filter coefficients. Therefore the algorithm is
frequently called “a` trous” algorithm (algorithm with holes). Note that for N samples
and m steps we get a
(
(m+ 1)×N)-matrix of coefficients of the form
r1(1) r1(2) · · · r1(N)
r2(1) r2(2) · · · r2(N)
...
... · · · ...
rm(1) rm(2)) · · · rm(N)
sm(1) sm(2) · · · sm(N)
 (6)
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Figure 2: Cascaded filter banks for the “a` trous” algorithm
As an illustration, for the interrupted pure sign shown in figure 3, the coefficients resulting
from the “a` trous” algorithm with 6 steps are shown in figure 4. This signal may be
considered as a model for the transmission with packet loss. For the calculation of the
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Figure 3: Original signal (pure sine with packet loss)
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Figure 4: Redundant wavelet coefficients for the signal of figure 3
coefficients the Deslauriers-Dubuc filters DD(8,8) have been used, the implementation
uses the lifting scheme with boundary conditions “reflection with repetition” in each
lifting step (for the details, the reader is referred to [5]).
The same test corpus has been used as in [2]. It contains a set of 5 000 audio files
obtained from regular telephone calls and a set of 200 files consisting of 20 original spam
signals and 180 versions changed by packet loss, noise, audio- and telephone codecs. They
are here called “normal” spam signals. This test corpus has been expanded by a set of
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45 “special” spam signals which has been generated using 5 selected regular calls (by
creating 8 similar versions of each). Note that if we speak of spam detection here, this
means always that a similarity of the signals is detected. The semantic content is not
analyzed. By its semantic content our special spam signals are regular calls.
2 First construction of a hash vector using zero cross-
ings of wavelet coefficients
Our aim is to find a robust mapping which maps a large data vector (our audio data) to
a characteristic small hash vector. Robust means that the small vector should be similar,
if the audio data are changed by adding noise, amplification or other changes to hinder
identification. It should also be similar if the data vector is changed by transmitting it
using a noisy channel or by coding (e.g. GSM). Comparing the small hash vectors should
permit to conclude that the original data are slightly changed versions of the same spam
message.
The redundant wavelet transform with m steps associates to a data vector with N
components a coefficient matrix with
(
(m+ 1)×N) matrix elements, it increases the size
of data. We therefore have to reduce them. It has turned out to be useful to neglect the
high pass output of the first step, i.e. the first row of the coefficient matrix of the form
(6). This reduces a part of eventually added noise. We keep only the (m×N) coefficient
matrix
W =

r2(1) r2(2) · · · r2(N)
...
... · · · ...
rm(1) rm(2)) · · · rm(N)
sm(1) sm(2) · · · sm(N)
 (7)
It has been pointed out by Mallat in [4] that the original signal may be approximately
reconstructed using only the zero crossings of the redundant wavelet coefficients and the
sums of the coefficients between the zero crossings. This motivates the following procedure
to reduce our data
Wik 7→
{
1 if Wik ≥ 0
0 if Wik < 0
(8)
The zero crossings of the coefficients correspond to column indices where the value 1
changes into 0 or vice versa. We call the matrix resulting by the change (8) again W. It
may be visualized by representing a zero value by a black bar and the value one by a white
bar. This is done in figure 5 for a part of the original spam signal “SPIT 03 Behring” and
its GSM-coded version. It is clearly visible that the obtained binary values reflect well
the similarity of the signals.
In our experiments, we choose a wavelet transform with 6 steps in scale. Discarding
the finest scale, the above procedure furnishes therefore 6 binary values per sample. We
take the corresponding integer and obtain an integer hash value between 0 and 63 for
each sample. We shall call this integer here the primary hash value.
For each file we neglect the first 10 000 audio samples, perform the wavelet transform
for the following 50 400 samples. To avoid the influence of boundary conditions of the
wavelet transform, we omit all coefficients belonging to the first and last 200 samples.
We calculate the primary hash values for the remaining samples and obtain for each file
a primary hash vector with 50 000 integer components. At a sampling frequency of 8 kHz
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Figure 5: Visualistion of the binary values obtained from the wavelet coecients by (8)
for a spam signal (above) and its GSM-coded version (below)
this means that we use only a part of a duration of 6.25 s of our signal. As we discard
the nest scale, we only investigate a frequency range below 2 kHz. Performing 6 steps
in scale means that the high pass coe cients of the coarsest scale we use correspond
essentially to a frequency range of 60 Hz.
Our procedure still generates far too much data for practical purposes. But it is
illustrative to look at the results of a rst test obtained by calculating the Hamming
distances of the generated vectors for all 200 normal spam audio les of our test corpus.
By symmetry it is su cient to calculate the Hamming distances d(i k) between le i and
k only for the case i > k, i.e. the part below the diagonal of the corresponding matrix.
In gure 6 each matrix element below the diagonal is represented by a gray value, the
maximal value corresponding to white, the minimal value to black. The dark triangles
Figure 6: Hamming distances for the binary hash values obtained by (8), the maximal
value corresponds to white, the minimal to black
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clearly show that most of the dierent versions of the same original spam le furnish
hash vectors which have a relatively low Hamming distance. This indicates that we may
recognize most spam signals by calculating the Hamming distance of our hash vectors.
But a closer look to the triangles shows that they all have gaps in the form of two bright
columns and two bright pixel in the upper left part. This is more clearly visible at gure 7
(which is a zoomed version of the upper left part of gure 6).
Figure 7: Hamming distances for the di erent versions of the spam les of type
 SPIT 01 ABeier and  SPIT 02 ABeier2 (zoom of the upper left part of gure 6)
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Figure 8: Frequency of the values of the Hamming distance for 77 421 pairs of regular
calls
The bright columns and the two bright pixel in the upper left part of the triangles
correspond to pairs which contain the versions  32kbps and  96kbps . They are gener-
ated by a shift and a subsequent MP3 coding. This shift has has not yet been taken into
account here and explains the high value of the Hamming distance despite the similarity
of the signals.
The visualization of the Hamming distances in gure 6 shows quite amazing pairs
of dark pixel spread over the whole range and outside the triangles where the similarity
of the signals explains small distances. It turns out that they belong to pairs of the
noised versions of di erent spam signals, but with the same type of noise, for instance to
the pairs  (SPIT 01 ABeier n20w, SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20w) and  (SPIT 01 ABeier n20p,
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Figure 9: Relative frequency (in percent) of the hash values for 394 regular calls with
50 000 samples each
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p)”. Those pairs are also visible in figure 7 at the left of the lower
left corner of the lower triangle. The similarity of the corresponding signals may be
explained by the fact that the same calculated noise has been added to different original
signals. It is remarkable that the hash vectors calculated here make this visible by a
smaller Hamming distance.
The behaviour of the Hamming distances of our hash vectors for the regular telephone
signals has been tested also. 400 files of our corpus have been randomly chosen. 6 of them
turned out to be too short to get the 60 400 samples we use, those too short files have
been discarded. From the remaining 394 files we get 77 421 different pairs for which the
Hamming distances have been calculated. Figure 8 shows the frequency of the different
values of the Hamming distances. We get a mean value µ = 149 916.65 and a standard
deviation of σ = 1 108.005. Supposing that the hash vectors are completely random we
would have an expectation value of µ = 150 000 and a standard deviation of σ = 273.861.
The mean value agrees quite well, but the empirical standard deviation is larger than the
value resulting from randomness. In fact, our hash vectors are not completely random
as their relative frequency shows for 400 at random chosen regular calls in figure 9. The
hash values 0 and 63 are far more frequent than for instance 21 and 42.
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Figure 10: Occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) in 4957 files for
regular calls
The number of of occurrences of the primary hash values 0 and 63 has been tested
for the whole corpus of 5000 regular calls, the result for 4957 files (the remaining do not
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contain enough samples) is shown in figure 10. Apparently about the first 1000 files behave
differently with respect to the chosen primary hash values. This is a further indication
that the occurrences of those values may not be considered as random.
3 Index positions of a primary hash value as new
hash vector
We denote our primary hash vector for each file h = (h1, h2, h3, . . . hN) where hk ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . 63} and N is the number of samples taken from the file (remember that we
chose here N = 50 000). This hash vector would furnish far too much data, and the
calculation of the Hamming distances would be too slow in practice. We have therefore
to reduce further those data. For this purpose, we select one fixed possible primary hash
value v ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . 63} and keep the index positions of this value in the vector h as new
secondary hash vector t, i.e. we consider the set
Hv =
{
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . N} | hk = v
}
(9)
and take for each file the elements of Hv in increasing order as the components of the
secondary hash vector
t = (t1, t2, t3, . . . tL) with tk ∈ Hv and 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < t3 < . . . tL ≤ N (10)
Note that the number of components L of this vector t differs from file to file (see figure 10).
For our test corpus and v = 0 or v = 63 a typical value is 2000. The use of the secondary
hash vector reduces our data from 300 000 to typically 32 000 bit per file.
As a measure of similarity of two files we take the number of elements in the intersection
of the set of components of the corresponding secondary hash vectors, i.e. we consider for
two secondary hash vectors
s = (s1, s2, s3, . . . sL) and t = (t1, t2, t3, . . . tM)
the number
nm :=
∣∣∣{s1, s2, s3, . . . sL} ∩ {t1, t2, t3, . . . tM}∣∣∣ (11)
Adopting our language to the procedure in [2] we shall call those index values in the
intersection “matches”. They indicate the time indices where the primary hash values in
both files agree with the chosen value (e.g. 0 or 63). Note that a high number of matches
nm signifies a great similarity, a low number a small similarity. We expect that even for
regular calls we may have a small number of matches. Instead of the clumsy notation of
(11) we shall use here the shorthand notation
nm :=
∣∣s ∩ t∣∣ (12)
Figure 11 shows the result of two experiments with regular calls. For the left side we
choose the primary hash value 0 and for the right side the primary hash value 63. The
relative frequency of the number of matches for all possible pairs is shown (in black).
Furthermore the corresponding normal distribution is indicated (in blue) and the corre-
sponding gamma distribution in red. The calculations are based in both cases on the
random selection of 2 000 files where 20 files turned out to be too short. Therefore the
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Figure 11: Relative frequency of matches for regular calls and primary hash values 0 (left)
and 63 (right)
Figure 12: Number of matches for regular calls and primary hash values 0 (left) and 63
(right) for 100 randomly chosen les. White corresponds to a number greater or equal to
 + 1 5 , black to less or equal to  1 5
number of matches had to be calculated for 1 959 210 pairs. The parameters for the
gamma distribution have been calculated from the empirical mean and variance. The
gamma distribution seems to be the better approximation to the experimental one, but
the asymptotic decrease of the experimental distribution is apparently even slower.
Figure 11 might give the impression that the number of matches for regular calls is
completely random. In gure 12 the number of matches is visualised for experiments with
only 100 les. The dark and bright lines and columns clearly indicate that for certain les
all pairs containing this le have a particular high or low number of matches. This may
be explained by the di erent number of the selected primary hash value in certain les.
A very large number of elements in one set may lead to a larger number of elements in
the intersection with many other sets.
Considering the statistics of the number of matches for regular calls in gure 11 a
reasonable rst trial for a threshold for spam is 200, i.e. we may consider two signals as
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Figure 13: Decrease of the relative frequency of false positive diagnostics if the threshold
is increased for primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right), a total number of more than
1.9 · 106 pairs have been analyzed
similar and therefore classify them as spam if the number of matches for 0 or 63 is above
or equal to 200. Supposing that the number of matches for regular calls is given by the
gamma distribution, this threshold for spam detection would lead to a probability for a
false positive classification of 1.9 · 10−8 for the primary hash value 0 and a probability
of 2.6 · 10−8 for the primary hash value 63. Note that this is an underestimation as the
experimental values for large number of matches lie above those of the gamma distribution.
In fact, we had false positive diagnostics for pairs of regular calls with the chosen threshold.
We might reduce their number by increasing the threshold, but this would increase the
number of undetected spam pairs. The decrease of the frequency of false positive pairs
depending on the threshold is shown in figure 13, this is based on an experiment with more
than 1.9 · 106 pairs of files. Note that those false positive results do not seam completely
random. It is quite amazing that all the concerned filenames are within a relatively small
part of the alphabetic list of the filenames (for the primary hash value 0 see table 3 in
the appendix).
It should be remarked that we have as quite exceptional result 1653 matches for the
files “g215aB5” and “g218aB6” for the hash value 63. The number of matches for more
then 12 · 106 pairs has been calculated to find this exception. This pair does not belong
to those randomly chosen for figure 11. This event would be highly improbable if the
number of matches were really gamma distributed.
Despite those reflections we used the threshold 200 for our experiments. Figure 14
shows the corresponding result for our normal test spam signals, all pairs of files identified
as similar in that sense correspond to a white pixel, values below the threshold are darker,
black corresponds to the minimal value. Qualitatively this result looks very similar to
the Hamming distances in figure 6 if one notes that here darker gray corresponds to less
similar signals. Again the different spam sorts are visible as triangles with some gaps —
at the same place for different sorts — which correspond to shifted signals not recognized
as similar. And again most of the files of different spam type with the same kind of
calculated noise are recognized as similar.
But there are some remarkable differences to the Hamming distances: For the sixth
type of spam (characterized by “SPIT 06 Bank” in the file name) even the versions con-
taining a shift are recognized as similar. For the primary hash value 0 none of the spam
versions of the last type (characterized by “SPIT 20 unbek” in the file name) would be
recognized as similar. Furthermore the number of matches for pairs of different spam
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Figure 14: Number of matches for normal spam calls and primary hash value 0 (left)
and 63 (right), pairs with matches above the threshold of 200 correspond to white pixel,
smaller values correspond to darker gray values
types should be quite low, but this is not the case. Furthermore, pairs containing spam
type 6 signals have a comparatively large number of matches for primary hash 0 and
an exceptionally low number of matches for primary hash 63 (clearly visible as thick
black “column” and “line”). And for spam type 20 (the last one), the opposite may be
stated. We have a comparatively large number of matches for 63 and a remarkably low
number of hashes for 0.
Therefore the statistics of matches of pairs of different normal spam types and of pairs
formed by regular calls and the original spam messages has been investigated for the se-
lected primary hash values 0 and 63, the result is shown in figure 15. It is qualitatively
different from the corresponding results obtained by pairs of regular calls shown in fig-
ure 11. A striking difference is the appearance of a second local maximum. Those results
indicate that the normal spam signals have some qualitative differences to the signals of
the regular calls. Great care is therefore needed not to base the spam detection on such
differences which might be for instance due to different techniques of registration. The
number of occurrences of the selected primary hash values 0 and 63 for the original spam
signals in figure 16 shows some further particularity. For the last type, the hash value
0 occurs only 90 times, but the occurences of 63 attain their maximum with 3526. This
explains why this type of spam may not be detected using the primary hash value 0,
because the intersection with a set of 90 indices may never furnish enough elements to
attain the threshold of 200.
It might be tempting to recommend the primary hash value 63 instead of zero. But
this would be based on some unknown property of the last spam type, and there might
arise some new type of spam for which there are problems for the detection with this
primary hash value. Perhaps it is preferable to work with both selected primary hash
values 0 and 63. It should also be noted that this strange problem to detect the last spam
type using the primary hash value 0 disappears using the offset correction discussed in
section 6.
It has been considered that it might be necessary to test if our method depends on
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Figure 15: Relative frequency of matches for pairs of all versions of different normal spam
calls (above) and for pairs formed by regular calls and original spam signals (below). The
graphics at left show the results for the primary hash value 0, at right for 63
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Figure 16: Number of occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) for the
original spam signals
some unknown particularity of our normal spam test files. Therefore 5 regular calls have
been chosen to produce a special spam test corpus by creating similar versions. White and
pink noise has been added, the same type of packet loss has been simulated, two versions
of shifted and MP3-coded signals and two versions of G.726-coded have been created to
obtain 9 versions for each special spam file (compared to the “normal” spam files the
GSM version is lacking). It should be remarked that the files of regular calls chosen to
produce the special spam files have been selected to give a low number of primary hash
value 63 for the variant discussed in section 5 (low energy elimination). Here (i.e. without
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Figure 17: Number of occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) for all
special spam signals
Figure 18: Number of matches for the special spam calls (generated by 5 regular calls)
for primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right), pairs with matches above the threshold of
200 correspond to white pixel, smaller values correspond to darker gray values
the low energy elimination), the number of occurrences of the primary hash values shown
in gure 17 does not show any particularity except for the G.726-coded versions ( le
numbers 4, 13, 22, 31 and 40). The number of matches for all special spam les and the
selected primary hash values is visualized in gure 18. Comparing to gure 14 we see again
the light triangles corresponding to detected spam pairs which contain some darker parts
corresponding to  problem pairs such as the les with a shifted signal. Furthermore, for
primary hash value 63 there seems to be a problem for all types of special spam to detect
the similarity with noisy signals of the same spam type ( n20p and  n20w , indicated
by the two darker horizontal lines at the bottom of the triangles), although the number
of matches is not much below the threshold. But all pairs of di erent spam type with the
same kind of calculated noise are recognized as similar.
It might seem a good idea to modify our criterion for spam detection taking some
normalization of the number of intersection of the indices where the selected primary
hash value occurs. A possibility would be to divide by the product or the geometric mean
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of the number of elements of both sets of indices. But first essays were discouraging.
One reason is possibly that the quotient of two random variables may have undesirable
properties as has the the quotient of two normally distributed variables (the probability
density function is very slowly decaying for large values).
Furthermore it should be stated that many parameters in the experiments presented
here have been chosen by trial and error. Some caution is needed to make sure that
the choice of the parameters does not represent a local optimum and there might be a
completely different and far better choice of the parameters. Therefore a careful study of
the influence of the parameters is to be recommended.
4 Detecting similar but shifted signals using matches
of the secondary hash vector
We have to tackle the detection of shifted versions of spam signals as the versions of type
“32kbps” and “96kbps”. We fix first the maximal number of shifts we want to detect
as ∆m, i.e. we want to detect signals as similar where the samples have been shifted
by a number of index positions up to ±∆m. For our experiments, we fixed ∆m = 2000
which corresponds with a sampling frequency of 8 000 Hz to a time shift of 0.125 seconds.
An easy but very time consuming method consists in testing all possible shifts, i.e. to
consider the maximal number of matches for all shifts in this range, i.e.
ns := max−∆m≤k≤+∆m
∣∣∣{s1 + k, s2 + k, s3 + k, . . . sL + k} ∩ {t1, t2, t3, . . . tM}∣∣∣ with k ∈ Z (13)
or using the shorthand notation of (12)
ns := max−∆m≤k≤+∆m
∣∣(s + k) ∩ t∣∣ (14)
where the sum of a vector s and an integer scalar k is understood here componentwise as
indicated in the detailed notation of (13). If ns is greater than or equal to the threshold,
we may qualify the corresponding signals as spam. Note that this method is based on the
fact that we use here the redundant wavelet transform which has a simple behaviour under
translations: the shifted signal has correspondingly shifted coefficients and therefore leads
to a shifted secondary hash vector.
To get a faster detection of shifted signals we proceed here in three steps. First we
check on a coarse scale if one signal might be the shifted version of a signal similar to the
other one. We consider a coarse approximation to the procedure in (13) by dividing the
maximal shift ∆m in mc subshifts ∆m = mc · ∆c. For this coarse approximation we use
the coarse approximate hash vector
sc :=
(⌊
s1
∆c
+ 1
2
⌋
,
⌊
s2
∆c
+ 1
2
⌋
, . . .
⌊
sL
∆c
+ 1
2
⌋)
(15)
and an analogously defined approximate hash vector tc to construct the approximate
number of matches
nc = max−mc≤k≤+mc
∣∣sc + k ∩ tc∣∣ (16)
Note that this approximation means that we use an approximate time scale by dividing
the secondary hash values (which are time indices) by ∆c and rounding to integer val-
ues. Using this coarse time scale we need only to check translations up to ∆m
∆c
. In our
experiments we used ∆c = 80 and mc = 25.
14
If the number of matches obtained by (16) is greater than or equal to the threshold,
we call kc the shift k where the maximum is attained. We expect that this value is unique
if s comes from a shifted and slightly modified version of the signal which generates t,
otherwise we take the rounded mean of all the values where the maximum is attained.
In the original scale we expect that a shift of approximately kc ·∆c will give a maximum
of matches in (14), i.e. we may hope the shift we are looking for is in the interval
[(kc − 1) ·∆c, (kc + 1) ·∆c].
To improve this estimation we consider an intermediate scale dividing the maximal
shift ∆m in a larger number of smaller subshifts ∆i with ∆i < ∆c. We construct approxi-
mate hash vectors si exactly as in (15) with ∆c replaced by ∆i. But now we need not try
the whole range because we have already a good starting point by the interval found by
the search on the coarse scale. We only have to rescale this interval to the actual inter-
mediate time scale as here all time indices are divided by ∆i and rounded. We therefore
get from the “coarse” interval the condition for the intermediate indices
(kc − 1)∆c
∆i
≤ k ≤ (kc + 1)∆c
∆i
Introducing the abbreviation ks := kc ·∆c∆i we get the following intermediate approximation
ni = max
ks−∆c∆i ≤k≤ks+
∆c
∆i
∣∣si + k ∩ ti∣∣ (17)
The index k where this maximum is attained (or if this is not unique the rounded mean of
the corresponding indices) is now designated by ki and this furnishes the smaller interval
[(ki − 1) ·∆i, (ki + 1) ·∆i]. We hope our shift index is in this interval.
To get the final value, we have only to determine for kf := ki ·∆i
nf = max
kf−∆i≤k≤kf+∆i
∣∣s + k ∩ t∣∣ (18)
using our original secondary hash vectors s and t. This value will be taken as the final
number of matches for the decision if the investigated pair of signals is spam.
Note that for the simple trial in (14) we need 2 ·∆m + 1 calculations of intersections,
for our approximation in 3 steps we need only
2 ·mc + 1 + 2 · ∆c
∆i
+ 1 + 2∆i + 1
calculations. For our experiments this is a reduction from 4001 to 89 calculations of
intersections.
The result of an analysis of all normal spam versions of our test corpus with the above
described shift correction using the primary hash values 0 and 63 is shown in figure 19.
White pixel belong to a number of matches above the threshold which is again 200. The
corresponding pair is classified as spam. The success of our treatment is visible comparing
with the result without shift correction in figure 14. The dark columns inside and the two
dark squares at the top left of the white rectangles belonging to the shifted signals of type
“32kbps” and “96kbps” disappeared, the shifted signals are nearly all detected as similar.
Only a few isolated gray pixel inside the white triangles indicate some non detected spam
pairs as remaining problem cases — and again the completely undetected spam type in
the case of primary hash value 0 is visible at the lower right corner. A complete list of
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Figure 19: Matches for normal spam les with detection of shifted signals for primary
hash value 0 (left) and primary hash value 63 (right). A white pixel indicates a number of
matches at or above the threshold, therefore detection of the corresponding pair as spam
the remaining undetected spam signal pairs is given in table 5 and 6 (in the appendix).
Note that the whole test corpus has 20 types with 200 normal spam signals. This means
that a total number of 900 spam pairs should be detected. We have only about 6 2 %
problem pairs for primary hash value 0 and 1 4 % problem pairs for primary hash value
63. As a result we get that the shift detection presented here fails only with very few
spam versions of type  n20p (pink noise) and  GSM .
Figure 20: Matches for special spam les with detection of shifted signals for primary
hash value 0 (left) and primary hash value 63 (right). A white pixel indicates a number of
matches at or above the threshold, therefore detection of the corresponding pair as spam
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Again our method has been tested also for the special spam files generated by selected
regular calls, the result is shown in figure 20. Some of the noisy versions still lead to
problems with spam detection especially if the other file contains a shift. For the primary
hash value 0 we get 36 undetected spam pairs (20 %, as we should detect 180), and
for the primary hash value 63, there are two exceptional spam types (the last in our
ordering), where most of the shifted signals are not recognized. We get a total number of
91 undetected pairs (51 %).
5 Elimination of signal parts with low energy
A lot of variants of the procedure described here are possible. We shall restrict ourselves to
very few of them, one being the elimination of signal parts with low energy. This means
in practice that we may decide not to consider moments of silence. Here, to calculate
the energy, we use only the wavelet coefficients and not the original signal. Note that
therefore even very small amplitudes may lead to significant signal energy if their are
abrupt changes. As a measure for signal energy, for each sample the Euclidean norm of
the corresponding column vector of the matrix W given by (7) is calculated. Let us call
wk the kth column vector of W. We fix a threshold ε > 0 and discard the corresponding
column index in the calculation of the secondary hash vector, if the norm of the column
vector is not above the threshold. I.e. we replace (9) by
Hv =
{
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . N} | hk = v and ‖wk‖ > ε
}
(19)
Note that the secondary hash vector t formed by the elements of Hv in increasing order
then has only components where the signal energy is above the threshold, in general it
will become shorter by this additional condition.
It is remarkable that this procedure may essentially modify the number of matches
for pairs of signals. This is particularly striking for the exceptional pair “g215aB5” and
“g218aB6” leading to a false spam result with 1653 matches. Table 1 shows how this
number of matches decreases dramatically within a small range of the threshold ε. The
number of samples above the threshold Nk does not decrease very much in this range and
even the length of the corresponding secondary hash vectors decreases only by a factor 1
2
,
whereas the number of matches decreases by a factor 1
10
.
In contrast to this result the statistics of primary hash values as shown in figure 9
is only slightly changed by the elimination of the low energy parts. This can be seen in
figure 21 for the threshold values of ε = 10−5 and ε = 10−3. No dramatic change with
respect to figure 9 is visible, there is a slight increase of the occurrences of the preferred
values 0 and 63.
But the absolute value of the number of occurrences for our preferred primary hash
values decreases much as is shown in figure 22 (to be compared with figure 10). This
might prevent us in many cases to use the number of matches for spam detection, as the
number of elements of the intersection may not be larger than the number of elements in
the concerned single sets. We should therefore have a look at the statistics of the matches
for the regular calls in figure 23. The number of matches has decreased by the elimination
of low energy samples, but it should be noted that there have been found some few pairs
with number of matches above 150 and even one pair with 182 matches for the hash
value 0 and 203 matches for the hash value 63. In a further experiment with more than
1.9 · 106 pairs randomly chosen pairs, for the primary hash value 0 there has been found
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ε N1 N2 L1 L2 nm
1.00000D-09 50000 50000 5284 3841 1653
5.00000D-08 49963 47505 5284 3784 1651
5.50000D-08 49618 46806 5270 3750 1647
5.80000D-08 49359 46318 5230 3708 1640
5.85000D-08 49318 46231 5228 3701 1640
5.90000D-08 49085 46065 5219 3696 1637
5.95000D-08 48667 45763 5155 3655 1628
5.96000D-08 48292 45558 4963 3540 1593
5.96040D-08 48102 45442 4851 3482 1567
5.96045D-08 48079 45405 4851 3476 1566
5.96046D-08 48050 45389 4846 3468 1556
5.96047D-08 45725 43673 2670 1948 115
5.96050D-08 45620 43538 2618 1858 108
6.00000D-08 44701 43038 2260 1703 88
1.00000D-07 42733 37975 2121 1526 76
1.00000D-06 39048 17408 2113 799 43
1.00000D-05 29674 11577 2032 763 42
Table 1: Signal energy threshold ε, number of samples Nk above threshold, number of
components Lk of the corresponding secondary hash vector for primary hash value 63
for the exception files “g215aB5” (index 1) and “g218aB6” (index 2) and number nm of
resulting matches
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Figure 21: Relative frequency of the primary hash values with elimination of low energy
parts with threshold ε = 10−5 (left) and ε = 10−3 (right)
one pair of regular calls just at the threshold 200 and none above and none at or above
the threshold for the primary hash value 63. And in a third experiment there has been
no pair at or above the threshold for both primary hash values. Lowering the threshold
for the number of matches for spam detection would not be wise and is — as it turns out
— not necessary.
Despite of the decrease of the number of occurrences of the primary hash values, using
low energy elimination with threshold ε = 10−5 does not cause a significant change for the
detection of our normal spam signals, and this minor change is in opposite direction for the
two primary hash values 0 and 63. This is shown by the list of undetected spam pairs in
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Figure 22: Occurrences of the primary hash values 0 (left) and 63 (right) for all large
enough regular calls with elimination of low energy parts with threshold ε = 10−5
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Figure 23: Relative frequency of matches for regular calls for primary hash value 0 (left)
and primary hash value 63 (right) with elimination of low energy parts with threshold
ε = 10−5
table 7 and 8 (in the appendix, to be compared with table 5 and 6). For 0 as the primary
hash value, 5 former “problem pairs” dissappear. The pair “SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p”
and “SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps” for example is now clearly recognized with 626 matches.
But for the primary hash value 63, there are now 14 problem pairs instead of 13 without
low energy elimination, one former problem pair is now recognized, but two formerly
recognized pairs have now a number of matches below the threshold.
For our special spam files (obtained from regular calls), elimination of low energy parts
is disastrous for spam detection as is shown in figure 24. For primary hash value 0 we
have 79 undetected spam pairs, for primary hash value 63 we have 170 undetected pairs
(for a total number of 180 pairs to be detected). This means, for the primary hash value
63 less than 6 % of the spam pairs are detected. It should be remarked here that the five
audio files token for the generation of different versions of “special spam” files have been
chosen to produce problem cases using detailed knowledge of our spam detection. The
reason for the poor result is visible in figure 25. Those five files have been chosen as the 5
files with minimal occurrences of primary hash value 63 with low energy elimination in a
subset of our regular test files (in the set of “special spam” files they have the numbers 1,
10, 19, 28 and 37). In particular, for the file “g003aB7”(file number 10) and most of its
subversions (file number 11 to 16), the number of occurrences of the primary hash value
63 is below the threshold, so it is impossible by our method to recognize them as spam.
19
Figure 24: Number of matches for special spam calls for primary hash value 0 (left) and
primary hash value 63 (right) with elimination of low energy parts with threshold = 10 5
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Figure 25: Occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) for the special spam
calls (generated from 5 regular calls) with elimination of low energy parts with threshold
= 10 5
Concluding this section it may be stated that elimination of the low energy parts of the
signal alone has no signi cant advantages for the detection of spam by the method pre-
sented here, but it decreases the probability of false positive diagnostic. It should however
be kept in mind that the secondary hash values are the time indices when some charac-
teristic signal properties arise. And the time positions when silence, some characteristic
background noises or other low energy signals are dominating might be a quite valuable
criterion which is robust against the modi cations considered here, e.g. additional noise.
6 In uence of the o set and o set correction of the
audio signals
It should be remarked that the signals of the test corpus contain contributions of very
low frequency and even an o set. This is shown in gure 26. It is visible that the o set is
robust to most of the changes by which the normal spam versions of the same type di er.
It should also be remarked that the o set of some spam versions is much larger than all
o sets of the regular calls. An o set in an audio signal is not considered to have much
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Figure 26: Offset of the signals of the test corpus, at the left for the regular calls, at the
right for all versions of the normal spam calls
importance. One may eliminate the offset by replacing the vector a of the audio samples
by the following “offset corrected” vector a− a where a is the mean of a. The following
observations have been made introducing this correction of the offset to zero:
• The exceptional number of matches for the pair of regular calls “g215aB5” and
“g218aB6” decreases from 1653 to 1640.
• The number of occurrences of the primary hash values 0 and 63 is changed qualita-
tively, this number is much more varying from file to file and more files have very
few occurrences, compare figure 27 with 10.
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Figure 27: Occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) in 4957 files for
regular calls with offset correction
• The relative frequency of matches for regular calls in an experiment for more than
1.9 · 106 randomly chosen pairs is changed qualitatively which is visible in figure 28
(comparing it with figure 11); in particular for low values the curve looks quite
different. For high values, the frequency stays now below the value of the gamma
distribution, at least as far as it is visible.
• The relative frequency of false positive diagnostics is changed for the two primary
hash values 0 and 63 in the opposite direction: offset correction causes a decrease
for 0 but an increase for 63. This may be seen comparing figure 29 with figure 13.
Again the filenames of the pairs in table 4 (in the appendix) are near together in
21
rel. freq.
normal distribut ion
gamma distribut ion
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
0 50 100 150 200
1980 u. calls, offset corr., hv= 0, mw= 60.055417, var= 548.16797, p=  6.5794671, a= 9.1277024
rel. freq.
normal distribut ion
gamma distribut ion
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
1980 u. calls, offset corr., hv= 63, mw= 65.39654, var= 539.05022, p=  7.933783, a= 8.2427942
Figure 28: Relative frequency of matches for regular calls with offset correction and
primary hash values 0 (left) and 63 (right)
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Figure 29: Decrease of the relative frequency of false positive diagnostics with offset
correction if the threshold is increased for primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right), a
total number of more than 1.9 · 106 pairs have been analyzed
the alphabetic list and not randomly distributed. Note however the increase of the
decay parameter of the gamma distribution for both primary hash values, i.e. we
get a stronger decay for increasing number of matches. In a further experiment (the
same number of pairs, again randomly chosen) we got 12 pairs with a number of
matches at or above the threshold for the primary hash value 0, but for the primary
hash value 63 we got 632 pairs of regular calls which would have been classified as
spam, which is significantly worse than without offset correction.
• Detection of normal spam is better. For primary hash value 0, the number of “prob-
lem pairs” is reduced from 56 to 12, for the primary hash value 63, the reduction is
from 13 to 8, compare table 9 and 10 with 5 and 6
• For our special spam files and primary hash value 0, we get 80 undetected pairs
(44 %). This is much worse than without offset correction. For primary hash value
63, we obtain 33 undetected pairs (18 %) which is an improvement. The result is
visualized in figure 30.
Concluding this section it may be stated that offset correction alone seems to have some
advantages for spam detection, but it increases the probability of false positive diagnostics
for primary hash value 63.
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Figure 30: Spam detection for special spam les, o set correction and primary hash values
0 (left) and 63 (right)
7 Combining o set correction and low energy elimi-
nation
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Figure 31: Occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) in 4957 les for
regular calls with both o set correction and low energy elimination
The o set correction described in the previous section may be combined with the
elimination of low energy parts of the signal (see section 5). We chose a threshold of
= 10 5 for the energy and made the following observations:
 Adding o set correction to low energy elimination slightly lowers the occurrences
of the primary hash value 0, for the primary hash value 63, there seems to be no
signi cant change (see gure 31).
 Elimination of low energy parts with o set correction further improves (normal)
spam detection only for primary hash value 0 for which the number of undetected
spam pairs is further decreased from 12 to 8, for the primary hash value 63 we
have the same undetected pairs (as for low energy elimination alone), the number
of matches is partially changed, see table 11 and 12 (in the appendix).
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Figure 32: Spam detection for special spam les with both o set correction and low energy
elimination for primary hash values 0 (left) and 63 (right)
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Figure 33: Occurrences of primary hash value 0 (left) and 63 (right) for the special spam
calls (generated from 5 regular calls) with both elimination of low energy parts with
threshold = 10 5 and o set correction
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Figure 34: Relative frequency of matches for regular calls with o set correction and low
energy elimination for primary hash values 0 (left) and 63 (right)
 Detection of the special spam signals is very bad again. For the primary hash
value 0, we get 102 undetected pairs (57 %), and for the primary hash value 63, we
get 133 undetected pairs (74 %). Note however at the visualization of the number of
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matches in figure 32 that our method indicates clearly the similarity of most special
spam files of the same type. The problem is the low absolute number of matches
compared to those for pairs of most of the regular calls which is caused by the low
number of the corresponding primary hash values shown in figure 33.
• In an experiment with more than 1.9 · 106 pairs and threshold 200, for primary
hash value 0 there has been no pairs detected with false positive diagnostic, and for
primary hash value 63 there was just one such pair, in a further experiment with
other randomly chosen pairs there was no such such pair for both primary hash
values. The relative frequency of the number of matches for those experiments is
quite similar to the case of low energy elimination without offset correction, it is
shown in figure 34.
Those experiments indicate that it seems to be most advantageous for our method to
include both offset correction and low energy elimination.
8 Conclusion
The use of the zero crossings of part of the redundant wavelet coefficients turns out to offer
quite remarkable possibilities to obtain characteristic values for audio signals which are
robust against modifications as the addition of noise. Those characteristic values may be
applied to detect the similarity of audio signals and this may be used to detect telephone
spam without analyzing the semantic content by speech recognition. Instead of the index
position of the zero crossings, here the sign of the coefficients at each index position is
used. It turns out that the time indices when all the coefficients considered are positive or
zero — which corresponds to our primary hash value 63 — or when they all are negative
— which corresponds to our primary hash value 0 — are particularly useful. In practice,
it will possibly have many advantages to use them both in combination. This might avoid
the difficulty to recognize similar signals when one of them has very few samples where
the primary hash value 0 or 63 alone occurs.
The proposed method may be improved by subtracting the mean of the original audio
signal to get zero offset and by elimination of the coefficients representing low energy
parts of the signal. Table 2 resumes the essential results for the original method and
those additional changes. As indicator of the success we used the following calculated
values
• the decay rate parameter a resulting from the assumption that the number of
matches of regular calls is gamma distributed (with probability density function
f(x) = a
p
Γ(p)
xp−1e−ax, a larger value of a should make false positive results less prob-
able which is desirable)
• the number nu of undetected normal spam pairs
• the number nf of false positive diagnostics for about 1.9 ·106 randomly chosen pairs
of regular calls
• the number su of undetected special spam pairs
Those values have been calculated for the primary hash values hp = 0 and hp = 63 for
the following variants of our method
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©1 without low energy elimination and without offset correction (see section 4)
©2 with low energy elimination using a threshold of ε = 10−5 but without offset correction
(see section 5)
©3 without low energy elimination but with offset correction (see section 6)
©4 with both low energy elimination using a threshold of ε = 10−5 and offset correction
(see section 7)
Note that for the calculation of the number of false positive diagnostics nf indicated in
table 2 a special experiment with the same randomly chosen pairs (about 1.9 · 106 pairs)
for all 8 rows has been performed for better comparison. Slightly different results with
other randomly chosen pairs have been mentioned in previous sections.
variant section hp a nu nf su
©1 4 0 3.62 56 33 36
©1 4 63 4.78 13 248 91
©2 5 0 9.68 53 0 79
©2 5 63 9.72 14 0 170
©3 6 0 9.13 12 12 80
©3 6 63 7.93 8 632 33
©4 7 0 8.96 8 0 102
©4 7 63 9.05 8 0 133
hp primary hash value
a decay parameter for the number
of matches for regular calls
nu number of undetected
normal spam pairs
nf number of false
spam diagnostics
su number of undetected
special spam pairs
Table 2: Re´sume´ of essential results for variants of the method described here; “section”
refers to the section, where the variant is described
The results indicate clearly that combining low energy elimination and offset correction
is the most advantageous variant with the caveat that their might be a possibility to
prevent the detection using spam signals with specially adapted properties if the detail
and the chosen variant of the method is known — as is illustrated by our special spam
signals.
For the test corpus investigated here — without the special spam signals — the results
presented show that we may detect nearly all pairs of different versions of the same spam
message. The possibility of false positive diagnostics is quite low. It is remarkable that
the method presented here makes even the similarity visible of most of the different spam
signals of the test corpus to which the same calculated noise has been added.
Our results indicate that the use of the redundant wavelet transform may have advan-
tages compared to the usual Fourier methods and also to the use of the wavelet transform
with subsampling. It would be of interest to analyze those advantages in a detailed quan-
titative study. From the point of view of future practical use, the main problem will be
to implement a fast algorithm to calculate the intersection of two already ordered sets of
non negative integers.
The detection of similarity without analyzing the content of the message (which is
wished in order to respect the privacy of telephone calls) includes always the risk that
this identification is due to some particularity which is common to otherwise completely
different signals or which is different for an otherwise similar content. This means that
there is a risk of false positive diagnostics which is not due to random effects — or a risk
not to detect similar signals.
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The parameters and the variants of the method presented here have been chosen
to illustrate the qualitative properties of our method. Before drawing more detailed
conclusions of the corresponding results, it should be noted that first of all, the test
corpus used here should be critically investigated as it presents many particularities which
deserve further attention. Some parameters for the regular calls have values that are not
at all random as they are qualitatively different for the first 1 000 files compared to the
rest (see for instance figure 26 and 27), the difference may not be explained by random
effects. Some care is therefore needed interpreting our results based on randomly chosen
subsets of those regular calls. Similarly, parameter values of some types of the normal
spam signals are qualitatively different from those of the other types which can be seen
in figure 26. And those parameter values influence essentially the success of our method.
If a method for spam detection is known in detail, it is in many cases possible to
generate spam signals which are quite difficult to be detected by this method. This has
to be kept in mind analyzing the relatively poor results concerning our special spam files.
It has been mentioned already that they have been generated from regular calls with very
few occurrences of the primary hash value 63 (with low energy elimination), therefore
making our method particularly unsuccessfull.
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A Appendix
filename 1 filename 2 nm
g241aB3 g013aA7 208
g215aB2 g014aA4 202
g239aB3 2 g014aA5 216
g215aB2 g014aA8 210
g215aB2 g016aA2 216
g232aB9 2 g016aA2 210
g215aB2 g016aA9 207
g215aB1 g203aB1 213
g239aB3 2 g203aB7 202
g231aB2 g213aB7 213
g215aB2 g215aB1 201
g216aB5 g215aB1 203
g234aB5 2 g215aB1 209
g241aB3 g215aB1 227
g216aB5 g215aB2 227
g231aB2 g215aB2 204
g232aB8 g215aB2 208
filename 1 filename 2 nm
g232aB9 2 g215aB2 214
g234aB2 g215aB2 206
g234aB5 2 g215aB2 204
g239aB3 2 g215aB2 228
g241aB3 g215aB2 205
g234aB5 2 g216aB5 218
g239aB3 2 g216aB5 226
g241aB3 g216aB5 204
g234aB2 g218aB5 205
g234aB5 2 g232aB9 2 228
g239aB3 2 g232aB9 2 214
g447aB4 2 g232aB9 2 205
g239aB3 2 g234aB2 200
g239aB3 2 g234aB5 2 202
g239aB3 2 g237aB3 2 200
g241aB3 g239aB3 2 209
Table 3: Pairs of regular calls with false positive diagnostics without offset correction for
primary hash value 0, note that in the alphabetic list, the filenames go from g001aA1 2
to g931aB11; nm denotes the number of matches
filename 1 filename 2 nm
g018aB4 g012aB7 200
g215aB2 g018aB1 205
g046aB8 g018aB4 218
g215aB1 g018aB4 212
g215aB2 g018aB4 200
g227aB8 g018aB4 223
filename 1 filename 2 nm
g215aB2 g018aB5 224
g218aB5 g018aB5 211
g046aB8 g046aB2 206
g215aB2 g046aB8 209
g216aB5 g046aB8 212
g216aB5 g215aB2 202
Table 4: Pairs of regular calls with false positive diagnostics with offset correction for
primary hash value 0, note that in the alphabetic list, the filenames go from g001aA1 2
to g931aB11; nm denotes the number of matches
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filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 121
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 119
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 111
SPIT 11 Hermans1 n20p SPIT 11 Hermans1 32kbps 180
SPIT 11 Hermans1 n20p SPIT 11 Hermans1 96kbps 172
SPIT 12 Hermans2 GSM SPIT 12 Hermans2 32kbps 74
SPIT 12 Hermans2 n20p SPIT 12 Hermans2 32kbps 156
SPIT 12 Hermans2 n20p SPIT 12 Hermans2 96kbps 149
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 GSM SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 66
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 73
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 69
all 45 signal pairs of type “SPIT 20 unbek” with 90 matches or less
Table 5: Spam detection with shift correction: undetected normal spam pairs using pri-
mary hash value 0
filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 65
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 68
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 154
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 155
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 GSM SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 113
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 72
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 96kbps 72
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 GSM SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 81
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 82
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 GSM SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 124
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 91
SPIT 20 unbek GSM SPIT 20 unbek 32kbps 176
SPIT 20 unbek GSM SPIT 20 unbek 96kbps 177
Table 6: Spam detection with shift correction: undetected normal spam pairs using pri-
mary hash value 63
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filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 121
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 117
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 57
SPIT 11 Hermans1 n20p SPIT 11 Hermans1 32kbps 167
SPIT 11 Hermans1 n20p SPIT 11 Hermans1 96kbps 144
SPIT 17 Rademchr2 n20p SPIT 17 Rademchr2 32kbps 134
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 73
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 67
all 45 signal pairs of type “SPIT 20 unbek” with 90 matches or less
Table 7: Spam detection with shift correction: unrecognized signal pairs with low energy
elimination with threshold ε = 10−5 using primary hash value 0
filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 65
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 68
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 147
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 150
SPIT 04 BMW n20p SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 101
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 66
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 96kbps 67
SPIT 11 Hermans1 n20p SPIT 11 Hermans1 96kbps 36
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 GSM SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 80
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 82
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 GSM SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 124
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 91
SPIT 20 unbek GSM SPIT 20 unbek 32kbps 167
SPIT 20 unbek GSM SPIT 20 unbek 96kbps 167
Table 8: Spam detection with shift correction: unrecognized signal pairs with low energy
elimination with threshold ε = 10−5 using primary hash value 63
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filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 113
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 114
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 79
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 102
SPIT 04 BMW n20p SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 117
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 GSM SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 132
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 113
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 GSM SPIT 07 DimpelM1 96kbps 116
SPIT 12 Hermans2 GSM SPIT 12 Hermans2 32kbps 37
SPIT 12 Hermans2 GSM SPIT 12 Hermans2 96kbps 41
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 114
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 126
Table 9: Spam detection with shift and offset correction : unrecognized signal pairs using
primary hash value 0
filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 76
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 79
SPIT 04 BMW g726 16 SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 166
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 95
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 75
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 96kbps 75
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 82
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 85
Table 10: Spam detection with shift and offset correction : unrecognized signal pairs using
primary hash value 63
filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 100
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 110
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 79
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 97
SPIT 12 Hermans2 GSM SPIT 12 Hermans2 32kbps 37
SPIT 12 Hermans2 GSM SPIT 12 Hermans2 96kbps 41
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 115
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 123
Table 11: Spam detection with shift and offset correction and elimination of low energy
parts with threshold ε = 10−5: unrecognized signal pairs using primary hash value 0
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filename 1 filename 2 number of matches
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 32kbps 76
SPIT 02 ABeier2 n20p SPIT 02 ABeier2 96kbps 79
SPIT 04 BMW g726 16 SPIT 04 BMW 32kbps 162
SPIT 04 BMW GSM SPIT 04 BMW 96kbps 95
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 32kbps 71
SPIT 07 DimpelM1 n20p SPIT 07 DimpelM1 96kbps 71
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 32kbps 82
SPIT 18 MrSmith1 n20p SPIT 18 MrSmith1 96kbps 85
Table 12: Spam detection with shift and offset correction and elimination of low energy
parts with threshold ε = 10−5: unrecognized signal pairs using primary hash value 63
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